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Home Ownership Rates of Married Couples:
An Econometric Investigation
ABSTRACT
Ownership patterns for young (under 45) married couples are striking in
two respects. First, ownership rates rise dramatically withage: couples 35-
44 consistently have ownership rates nearly 50percentage points higher than
couples under 25. Second, half of the sharp ownership gains ofyoung married
couples in the l970s were reversed in the first half of the l980s. These
patterns do not hold either for single or other households or for married
couples over 44.
To increase understanding of this variability byage and over time, we
analyze the tenure behavior of young married couples usingaggregate
income/age—class data from the 1973—83 Annual (American) HousingSurveys (AHS).
The income of a household affects its tenure choice bothdirectly (the taste
for ownership rises with income) and indirectly (the costof owning declines as
income rises owing to the greater value of investment ina nontaxed asset for
investors in higher tax brackets). Age affects tenure choicebecause older
households have higher incomes, are less mobile(annual-equivalent transactions
costs are lower), have more wealth (portfolio diversification forowner—
occupiers is easier), and have more certain income (and are thusmore willing
to commit to ownership).
Price and income elasticities for tenure choice arecomputed, the rise in
ownership rates between 1973 and 1979 and the subsequent declineare
interpreted, and an impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ispredicted.
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Home ownership by younger married couples varies enormously with age:
the average ownership rate of couples age 35 to 44 has exceeded that of couples
under 25 by roughly 50 percentage points over the past quarter century, far
more than the differences between ownership rates of these two age classes for
single or other households. The ownership rate of married couples under 45 has
also varied markedly over time. During the 1970s, the ownership rate increased
by 9 to 11 percentage points for married couples under age 35 and by 7
percentage points for couples between ages 35 and 64. Half of these increases
were reversed in the l980s for couples under age 45; neither single, other, nor
older married households experienced significant declines.
To increase understanding of this variability by age and over time, we
analyze the tenure behavior of young (under 45) married couples using aggregate
income/age-class data from the 197 3-83 Annual (American) Housing Surveys (AHS).
The income of a household affects its tenure choice both directly (the taste
for ownership rises with income) and indirectly (the cost of owning declines as
income rises owing to the greater value of investment in a nontaxed asset for
investors in higher tax brackets). Age affects tenure choice because older
households have higher incomes, are less mobile (annual—equivalent transactions
costs are lower) ,havemore wealth (investment in housing is more easily
diversified), and have more certain income (and are thus more willing to commit
to ownership).
The paper is divided into five parts. The first is an examination of the
1973-83 Al-IS data on married couple ownership rates by age and income. The
second and third parts present a model for explaining tenure choice and report—2—
the empiricial estimates. Part IV uses the estimates to interpret the facts on
home ownership and to forecast the likely impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
on ownership rates. A short summary concludes the paper.
I. The Pattern of Ownership
The ownership rate for married couples increases with both age and
income. To illustrate this point, we have plotted the ownership rate (from the
AilS) against real income for married households under 25, 25—29, 30—34, 35—44
and 45—64 for 1973 (Figure 1) and 1983 (Figure 2) .Thereal income values are
based on midpoints of the nominal income ranges given in the AHS; where the
income range is unlimited (the highest class) ,125%of the lower end of the
range is used. The deflator is the CPI—U Xl (the rental equivalent
experimental measure that became the official method of calculating the CPI in
1983), equal to 1.0 in 1986. Thus the lowest income level plotted in 1973 is
$1500 (midpoint of the 0 to $3000 range) multiplied by 2.324, or $3486. The
1983 nominal income levels are multiplied by 1.095.
The positive age—ownership relationship is indicated by lower—age
ownership-income curves systematically lying below higher-age curves. In fact,
only a handful of "crossovers" of these curves occurs in the entire ten years
of AilS data. The positive income-ownership relationship is indicated by the
general positive slope of the curves. Here, two persistent exceptions seem to
exist. First, the ownership rate for the lowest income class (sometimes the
lowest two income classes, but still under 10,000 in 1986 dollars) is generally
higher than that for the next income class. This tends to be true for married
households of all ages, although somewhat less so for the youngest age class.
Second, the ownership rate for the youngest married households usually declines
from the second highest income class to the highest income class.—3—
The exceptions for the lowest income class arelikely due to a
mismeasurement of income. Some young, low—incomemarried-couple households are
in school and being temporarily supported by theirparents or other relatives
until the post-graduation increase in income occurs.Moreover, some low-income
married households of all ages are temporarilyunemployed, either totally or
partially. In both cases, current income would substantially understate
permanent or expected future income. At the high income end,very young
households may have only recently attained this income andthus may not have
yet adjusted to it (become owners).
The age-specific ownership rates for marriedcouples for the different
income ranges are the data to be explained inour econometric investigation.
The above examination suggests that a number ofpotential annual data
observations need to be deleted from consideration.Four types of deletions
are made:
1. Low income classes are dropped becausepermanent income is likely
greatly understated. We delete observations for income under7,500
in 1986 dollars, thereby removing the lowest incomeclass in 1973—75
and 1978 and the lowest two income classes in the othersix years.
2. The open—ended highest income class isdropped because the "mean"
income, and thus relevant tax rate, of the household is unknown.
3. Additional income classes above 56,000 in 1986dollars for married
couples under 25 are dropped because their incomesmay be temporarily
high and certainly have been only recently attained. Thisremoves
single additional observations in 1978, 1979, 1981 and 1983and two
observations in 1980.
4. single high-income observations aredropped in 1978 for couples 25—29
and 30-34 and in 1980 for couples 25-29 because too fewobservations
were obtained in the AIlS.
The potential and actual observations (incomeclasses) for each of the years
1973—83 are listed in Table 1. As can beseen, there are 60 total usable
observations for married couples under 25, 64 for those25-29, 65 for those
30—34, and 66 observations for married couples 35—44.—4—
Whydothe systematic positive relationships between ownership and both
age and income exist? One explanation is that the annual rental price of
owner—occupied housing is lower for older, higher income households. Older
households are less mobile, on average, and thus the transaction costs of
buying and selling a home and the up-front points and fees paid on a mortgage
are less on an annual—equivalent basis than they are for younger, more mobile
households. Further, higher income households are in higher tax brackets and
thus pay lower after—tax property taxes and mortgage rates (and opportunity
costs on own equity invested in housing). Alternative explanations include
older households being wealthier, and thus less likely to be either "equity" or
"affordability" constrained (or better able to hold a diversified portfolio
with owner—occupied housing in it), and having more certain income streams, and
thus being more willing to commit to the ownership of housing than younger
households are.
The income/ownership profiles in 1973, 1979 and 1983 are indicated in the
upper part of Table 2 for married couples in four different ageclassesJ For
1973 and 1983, these data are linear interpolations between the points plotted
in Figures 1 and 2. A similar procedure was used for 1979. As can be seen,
ownership rates for any given age/income household rose between 1973 and 1979
and then declined through 1983. These movements are consistent with changes in
the annual cost of owner housing relative to the cost of rental housing. The
annual costs of owner housing for the married couples considered in the upper
part of Table 2 are listed in the lower part (the computation of the costs is
discussed in the Appendix) .Between1973 and 1979, these costs fell by 3/4 to
2½percentagepoints for households with incomes of 22,500 (1986 dollars) to
$60,000. The greater declines at higher incomes reflect greater increases in
tenure choice tax rates; at $60,000, these tax rates rose sharply (0.32 to
0.40) ,whileat $22,500, the rates actually fell (0.21 to 0.19) •2 Between 1979—5—
and 1983, owner costs rose by 6½ to 7 percentage points. While real rents also
declined between 1973 and 1979 and rose between then and 1983, the movements
were much smaller (less than 10 percent). Thus the ratio of costs moved as
owner costs did.
Whilenotshown in Table 2, the variation over time in ownership rates of
married couples above age 44 has.been far less than that ofyounger married
couples. This is not surprising. Because older households are less mobile and
have greater wealth than younger households, they should be less sensitive to
short run changes in housing costs. For this reason, we restrict ouranalysis
to married couples under 45.
II. The Model
We assume that household is level of utility is derived from the
consumption of a composite good x, the flow of housing services h, and a vector
of unobservable preference shifters z that are related to tenure status.Thus,
=U(x1,h1,z'). (1)
Goods x and h are priced in the market at p and We employ annual rental
costs as the measure of the price of obtaining housing services and denote them
by p for owners and p for renters. The z variables capture aspects of
ownership that affect utility even though the amount of the housing service
flow is held constant.
Maximization of utility subject to the budget constraint yields a
household's demand equations, and further substitution into the directutility
function yields the indirect utility function:
=V*(p,p', y1, z') (2)—6—
where j is the state of tenure, j =o,r,and y is the after-tax income of the
household if it rented. A household compares V1 and V and decides whether to
own or rent.
To develop an estimatable tenure choice equation, we assume that utility
can be represented as:
V V'' +e1 for j o,r. (3)
J J J
The probability of ownership is then:
o1 =Prob(V'> 1.7). (4) 0r
substituting (3) into (4) yields:
=Prob[(e'-e')sC(V'*-V1*)). (5)
We assume that both e and er have Weibull distributions yielding the familiar
logit form of estimation:
logit 0= ln[o1/(l_o1)] =V'—V*. (6)
We further assume that has a translog functional form (as used by King,
1980, in his study of tenure choice) and that the impact of the tenure status










Differencing the V±* as required by (6) yields:—7—






In this formulation the natural log of the odds of owning a house is a
function of the cost of owning compared to that of renting, quadratic terms in
these costs, an interaction term composed of the relative cost and income, an
interaction term composed of the relative cost and the price of the composite
good, and the difference between the z variables. This derivation of the form
of the estimating equation imposes a constraint on the regression coefficients




Each tenure state generates a particular value for z,, and we hypothesize
that the difference z1 —z1is a function of real after-tax income and o r
observable demographic characteristics:
i i iiI I Z —Z = f(y,A ,N ,M) (9)
where A is the age of household head, N is the number of dependents, and N is
marital status. An example of a "z" variable is "privacy". The amount of
privacy is greater for owners than renters for two reasons. First, rental
premises are subject to inspection by the landlord, and alterations of the
premises are subject to the landlord's approval. Second, and probably more
important, most detached houses are available for ownership, while most
attached units are available for rent.
One might anticipate that the value of privacy as an owner compared to a
renter differs by age of head, family size, the amount of the household's
income, and marital status. To test this hypothesis, we must control for the—8—
the estimating equation (8) and run separate regressions by age group. Then we
conduct pooling tests across age categories, thereby determining if the tenure
choice process differs significantly by age of head. We do not have data on
the number of dependents by age and income, but the number of dependents
increases monotonically up to age 44.(In 1980, the averages for married
couples were: 0.75 for Couples under 25, 1.5 for couples 25—34, and 2.25 for
couples 35-44.) Finally, we limit the empirical analysis to married couples.
We use real after—tax income of the household if it rented (the tax
saving from housing investment is captured in the owner cost variable) for the
measure of y (deflation is by the CP1-U Xl using 1985 as the base year). The
variable p is measured as the ratio of the nonhousing component of the CPI to
the entire CPI. The computation of owner cost variables follows Hendershott
and Shilling (l982a), with the tax rate calculation based on Hendershott and
Slemrod (1983). In these calculations, the assumed holding period should be
positively associated with age. We use 3 years for households under 25, 5
years for households 25—29 and 30—34, and 7 years for households 35—44. The
real rental cost is the Lowrey (1981) index, equal to 100 in 1977, deflated by
the CPI—U Xl, also equal to 100 in 1977. To convert this series to a
percentage analogous to the owner cost, we first compute the "equilibrium"
rental cost in 1977 (following Hendershott and Shilling), as c. The cost in
other years is then computed as the real rental cost times c. Details on the
cost calculations are contained in the appendix.
Two and four year lagged responses to increases in owner costs are tested
(with two years mattering but four years not) .Youngmarried couples are
relatively mobile and thus might be expected to respond fairly rapidly to
declines in the cost of owning; renters have an incentive to switch quickly,
especially if they can lock-in fixed rate mortgage money. However, when the
cost of owning rises, owners with below—market fixed rate money can reasonably—9-
delay switching to renting. The variables added to the estimation equation (8)
are the difference between the current and lagged values of the natural log of
the price ratio, if postive, or zero. Thus we anticipate positive
coefficients, and the coefficient on the log of the current price ratio is the
long-run response.
III. Estimation
The empirical estimates are reported in this section, and the results are
interpreted in the next. Three estimates are discussed: the unpooled age-
class equations, pooled estimates with age-varying constant terms, and pooled
estimates with age-varying constant terms and linear income responses.3 The
latter are our preferred estimates.
Table 3 contains the unpooled age class estimates of equation (8) with
the lagged price ratio term added. All variables are generally significant,
except for the price ratio term lagged four years.4 It is significant for the
youngest age group but insignificant (and with the incorrect sign in two of
three cases) for the other age classes. The adjusted R2s reveal that from
88.6% to 98.4% of the variation is explained. Lastly, the coefficient
restriction (a3 =-2a2
—
a4)implied by the theory is not rejected by the data.
Table 4 contains estimates for two equations pooled across the four age
classes. In the first equation, separate constant terms are estimated for the
four age classes but all other coefficients are constrained to be identical.
The t—statistics on the constants, which for the three age classes under 35—44
measure the significance of the difference between the constants for these
classes and that for the 35—44 age class, indicate that the differences in
constants are quite significant. Income and price elasticities have been
calculated at the bottom of the table for median income owners in the age
classes in 1973.We choose 1973 because owner costs were then near their mean—10—
values, being lower in the rest of the 1970s and higher in the 1980s, and real
after-tax incomes changed little over the 1973-83 decade. The income
elasticities decline sharply by age class, from 0.77 to 0.26. The price
elasticities are lower and also decline by age class, in absolute value, from
0.18 to 0.04.
In the next equation, the income coefficients and the constants are both
allowed to vary by age class. As with the constants, the t-statistics on these
coefficients for age classes under 35—44 indicate the significance of the
difference between the respective coefficients and that for the 35—44 age
class. The coefficients for the two youngest groups are significantly
different from that for the oldest group. This equation suggests lower income
and higher price elasticities, especially for younger households. Using a
Chow-type F test on pooling the data, we find that the age classes cannot be
pooled unless we allow for the constant to vary by age group. We can
confidently pool the data (as in the second equation in Table 4) if we allow
both the constant and the income coefficient to vary with age class. The price
elasticities here are about double those from the first equation, while the
income elasticities are about the same, except for the youngest age group.
Table 5 provides more detailed information on elasticities implied by the
second equation in Table 4. calculations are presented for the five income
levels used in the estimation for 1973. These incomes and their after—tax
levels in 1985 dollars are listed at the top of the table. Next are the income
and price elasticities followed by the estimated and observed ownership rates
for these income ranges by age class. The income elasticities decline by age
class, especially at high income levels; the elasticities tend to rise with
income for married couples under 30 but decline with income for older married
couples. The price elasticities approach minus unity for low income households—11—
and decline as incomes rise, reaching zero at before—tax income of about
$60,000. The 1973 data are well explained except for the highest income
married couples, where the equation substantially overpredicts ownership.
These income elasticities are similar to the 0.47 obtained by Rosen
(1979) in a cross section analysis of families in 1970. However, our price
elasticities are far smaller in absolute value than the —1.4 he reported. Our
elasticities are also smaller than the —0.5 to —1.0 estimates of Hendershott
and Shilling (1982a), who analyzed AIlS data but only over the 1973—79 period.
Hendershott and Shilling did not distinguish an age—class impact, and they did
not allow an income effect. Each of these differences from the present study
likely contributes to their larger estimates. On the other hand, our current
elasticities are similar to the time series estimates of Rosen and Rosen (1980)
and Hendershott and Shilling (1982b).
Much higher price elasticities estimates can be obtained from our data if
we allow the cross—section data to dominate. This is achieved by deleting the
income shifter, which effectively forces price to capture the positive
ownership—income correlation, and by allowing a four-year lagged response to
increases in the owner cost, which permits a high long-run price elasticity
without requiring a large decline in ownership between 1979 and 1983 (the
increase in owner costs since 1979 need not have an impact until after 1983).
The estimated elasticities for 1973 medium income owners in the four age
classes are —1.7, —1.4, —0.9 and —0.7, five to ten times greater than the —0.35
to -0.1 reported in Table 4. However, the unexplained variance doubles
relative to that of equation (2) in Table 4 due to a major worsening of the
time series fit: 12 percentage point increases in the ownership rate of median
income married couples in our three older age classes are predicted between—12—
1973 and 1983 versus the near constant observed aggregate ownership rates.6
This suggests caution in using price—elasticity estimates from cross-section
studies to make inferences about time series behavior.
IV. Applications
The empirical estimates are applied in two ways. First, we use them to
interpret the facts about home ownership discussed above, Second, we analyze
the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
An Interpretation
The empirical estimates from equation (2) in Table 4 can be used to shed
some light on the ownership facts emphasized earlier, namely the sharp increase
in ownership by age class, the rise in ownership between 1973 and 1979, and the
decline in the l980s. The average ownership rates by age class for 1973, 1979
and 1983 are listed in the upper section of Table 6. As can be seen, these
data (from the AIlS) indicate a 22 percentage point rise in ownership between
under-25 married couples and those 25—29, a 17 point further rise by the early
thirties, and another 9 point rise by 35-44. In total, the ownership rate is
almost 50 percentage points higher for married couples 35-44 than for those
under 25. With the exception of a small relative rise in ownership for those
35—44 in the 1980s, the ownership spreads have been constant over the 1973—83
period.
The lower section of Table 6 contains the after—tax real (1985 dollars)
incomes of the median income married couples in the various age classes for
1973, 1979 and 1983. The incomes are higher for older married couples and have
generally increased slightly over time. The exceptions are an over 4 percent
income decline (between 1979 and 1983) for those under 25 and a 4 percent
income rise for those 35—44 in the same period. The latter increase could
explain the relative rise in ownership between 1979 and 1983 for those 35—44.—13—
As we noted earlier, the higher ownership rates for older married couples
are at least partially explained by their higher incomes. Greater income leads
to greater ownership both directly and indirectly through lower owner costs
(higher tenure-choice tax rates). Older households are also less mobile and
thus the transaction costs of purchasing a house and obtaining a mortgage are
less onerous. We have accounted for this by calculating owner costs based on a
3 year holding period for married couples under 25, 5 years for couples 25—34,
and 7 years for couples 35-44. An interesting question, then, is how much of
the observed rise in ownership by married couples across age groups is
explained by these factors and how much by the constant terms in the estimated
equation? To answer this question, we simulated ownership rates for the median
income households in 1973, obtaining differences comparable to those observed
for the age classes (49 percentage point difference between those under 25 and
those 35—44 versus the 47 percentage point difference in Table 6) .Thenthe
equation was resimulated setting all constant terms equal to that for the 35—44
age class. We conclude that the economic variables explain about 40 percent of
the difference in ownership across age groups. The other 60 percent is likely
explained by the need to accumulate a downpayment, fewer dependents (and thus
lower taste for ownership) of younger married couples, and, possibly, less
certain incomes.
Table 7 reports observed changes in ownership rates by age class and
simulated changes in ownership rates for the median income married couples in
the age classes for 1973—79, 1979—83, and the total 1973—83 period. Note that
the simulations are for median income households, not for weighted averages of
households across the income spectrum, an experiment that would be expected to
reflect observed changes more closely. Two sets of simulations are performed
for each period, one with all variables varying and one with only prices
varying (income is held constant). Of the eight sub-period simulations, all—14—
move in the same direction as the observed change; 60 percent or more of the
observed change is captured in five of the eight cases; and 40 percent is
captured in two others. Only the sharp rise in ownership for the under 25
group in 1973-79 is badly missed. For the full 1973—83 period, the simulations
accurately portray the notable decline in ownership for the youngest married
couples, the relative constancy for couples 25-34, and the rise in ownership of
married couples 35-44.
The set of simulations that holds income constant implies that the price
variables, not income, explain most of the change in ownership. This is hardly
surprising given the relative constancy of real after-tax income. The one
exception is the full period rise in ownership for married couples 35-44, which
is entirely explained by higher real income.
Our estimated price elasticities are roughly consistent with earlier
estimates from time series data. The estimates of Hendershott and Shilling
(1982b) suggest about a 6 percentage point increase in the ownership rate in
response to the decline in owner costs between the early 1960s and late l97Os.
Moreover, they interpret the estimates of Rosen and Rosen (1980) as giving a
similar impact. Because half of the 6 point increase should have occurred by
1973, our 2 to 2.7 percent increase in ownership of married couples 25—44
between 1973 and 1979 is of the same order of magnitude as the time series
estimates.
The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is well understood to favor ownership over
renting (Hendershott, Follain and Ling, 1987). Owner costs will decline
relative to renter costs, and after—tax income for low and moderate income
households will rise. Here we translate the changes in these costs and incomes
into changes in ownership, using our estimates for the ownership decision.—15—
The Tax Act will increase our real after-tax income variable by 2 to 3
percent for married couples under 30 and by 2½ to 3½ percent for married
couples 30-44. The slightly larger percentage for older couples follows from
the assumption of two dependents for older households versus one for younger
(and the substantial increase in the personal exemption) -Theseincreases are
roughly independent of income throughout the $15,000 to $60,000 range. Given
that average tax rates over these incomes rise from 8 to 25 percent under
pre1986 tax law, the percentage tax cut declines from roughly 25 to 40 percent
at $15,000 (the higher number for married couples with two exemptions) to 7 to
8 percent at $60,000.(Note that these tax cuts are for renters; owners
experience slight tax increases because the cut in marginal tax rates reduces
the value of their housing deductions.) These average tax cuts exceed those
reported in the press, especially at higher incomes. The press data are
averages for renters and owners; the averages decrease sharply as income rises
because the weight given to owners rises sharply.
In the absence of a decline in interest rates, the Tax Act will tend to
raise owner costs, owing to the decline in tenure—choice tax rates, but rental
costs will increase even more. With a percentage point decline in interest
rates, owner costs will fall for most households, and the increase in rental
costs will be less. The ratios of owner costs to rental costs for different
income households are largely independent of whether interest rates are
constant or decline by a percentage point, and thus so are the ownership rates.
In our calculations, we draw upon the analysis of Hendershott, Follain and Ling
(1987) which assumes a percentage point decline in interest rates and predicts
a 10 percent increase in rents. With these assumptions, the ratio of owner to
renter costs declines by 10 to 15 percent.—16—
Table 8 reports the simulated increases in ownership rates for married
couples in our four age classes for three different before-tax income levels:
15,000, 25,000, and 40,000 (1988 dollars) .Becausethe price elasticities
decline with income, the responses are greater for lower income households.
For low income ($15,000) households, the ownership rate rises 2½ to 4
percentage points. By the $40,000 income level, the increase is under a
percentage point, and at the $60,000 income level the response is effectively
zero.
In 1983, roughly 9 million of the 25 million married couples under 45
had incomes between $10,000 and $25,000. A 2½ percentage point increase in
their ownership rate would increase the number of owners by 225,000. A one
percentage point increase in the rate for the about 7 million married couples
under 45 with incomes between $25,000 and $40,000 would increase owners by
70,000 more. The total 300,000 increase would constitute a 1¼ percentage point
rise in the ownership rate of all married couples under age 45. This increase
will occur over an extended period of time. Hendershott, Follain and Ling
(1987) argue that the rents will rise over a three to eight year period, the
longer adjustment occurring in areas with vacancy rates far above equilibrium
levels. Adding our two year ownership response suggests that the full
ownership effect will take five to ten years.
V. Summary
Ownership patterns for young (under 45) married couples are striking in
two respects. First, ownership rates rise dramatically with age: couples 35—
44 consistently have ownership rates nearly SO percentage points higher than
couples under 25. Second, half of the sharp ownership gains of young married—17—
couples in the 1970s were reversed in the first half of the 1980s. These
patterns do not hold either for single or other households or for married
couples over 44.
According to our estimates, roughly two—fifths of the rise in age-
specific ownership rates from under 25 to 35—44 is attributable to the increase
in income and reduction in mobility associated with age. Both of these changes
reduce the annual cost of ownership (a higher tax bracket favors investment in
a nontaxed asset and a longer holding period lowers annual equivalent
transaction costs). Moreover, the taste for ownership seems to rise with
income. The other three-fifths of the rise in age—specific ownership with age
is likely attributable to the greater wealth (less difficulty in making a down
payment) and larger number of dependents (and resultant greater demand for
privacy) of older married couples.
Our estimates explain over half of both the increase in ownership rates
of our four age classes between 1973 and 1979 and the decrease between 1979 and
1983. Virtually all of the differences in trend changes in ownership rates
over the full 1973—83 period (2½ percentage point decrease for married couples
under 25 versus 2 percentage point increase for those 35—44) is explained.
Most of the explanation comes from changes in the Cost of owning relative to
renting, although the trend increase in ownership for those 35—44 is due solely
to higher income.
For young married couples, the income elasticity of ownership is in the
0.3 to 0.6 range, and it seems to decline with age. This estimate is roughly
Consistent with Rosen's. The price elasticity declines sharply with both age
and income, exceeding —0.5 (in absolute value) for married couples under age 25
with incomes below $20,000 but being near zero for married couples with incomes
over $50,000 or over age 44. These estimates are roughly consistent with the
time series estimates of -0.15 (Hendershott and Shilling; Rosen and Rosen) but—18—
are only a tenth to a fifth of Rosen's cross sectional estimate. We illustrate
that estimates more comparable to Rosen's can be obtained from our data when
the cross—sectional variation is allowed to dominate the estimates, but that
such estimates are grossly inconsistent with the time series behavior of
ownership rates. This suggests a potential danger in using cross—section
estimates to interpret time series variation.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will raise after—tax incomes of married
couples and lower their cost of owning relative to renting. Thus an increase
in ownership should be expected. However, the increase in after-tax income is
small (2 to 3 percent) ,andour estimates of the price elasticities are low.
Thus we would forecast only a 300,000 increase in owning married couples or
about a 1¼ percentage point increase in the aggregate ownership rate of married
couples under 45.—19—
FOOTNOTES
Linear interpolations at incomes below $20,000 can give rise to substantial error
because the ownership—income curve is quite nonlinear; thus the lowest income level
in the table is $22,500 (median incomes for owners in the four age classes are
roughly $22,500, $30,000, $33,000 and $36,000).
2
Bracket creep acted to raise tenure choice tax rates sharply between 1973 and
1979. However, the increase in the personal exemption from $1000 to $3200 in 1977
of fset much, if not all, of the creep for those with incomes between 22,500 and
30,000 (1986 dollars)
Heteroscadasticity is present when aggregated data are used. A procedure
suggested by Kinenta (1986) was employed to correct for this problem.
Two other variables were tested: an age-class unemployment rate (possibly a proxy
for income uncertainty) and a mortgage payment constraint variable. The
unemployment rate had a coefficient near zero; the coefficient on the constraint
variable was unexpectedly positive.
The elasticity of Ownership with respect to the cost of owner housing
(ln o1/1n p' is:
=(1—
o')[b1+ 2b3ln p' —(2b3+ b5)ln y1 + b5ln p].
The elasticity of the ownership rate with respect to the cost of rental housing
is the negative of the elasticity with respect to the cost of owner housing
plus (l_oi)2b3ln(p/pr). Lastly, the elasticity of ownership with respect to
income is (l—o1)(b6y1 -
(2b3+ b5)ln(p'/p)].
6
Moreover, the equation would predict an enormous (about 20 percentage point)
ownership decline between 1983 and 1985 when the jump in owner costs between 1979
and 1981 was allowed to have its full impact.—20—
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Table 1: Potential and Actual Data Observations
Potential Actual
Year (income classes) Under 25 25—2930—3435—44
1973 7 5 5 5 5
1974 7 5 5 5 5
1975 9 7 7 7 7
1976 9 6 6 6 6
1977 10 7 7 7 7
1978 10 7 7 7 8
1979 10 6 7 7 7
1980 10 5 6 7 7
1981 10 6 7 7 7
1983 10 6 7 7 7
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table3: Unpooled Age Class Ownership Estimates
(t—statistics in parentheses)
Variable Age Class
25 25—29 30—34 35—44
price.ratio: —4.56 —7.16 —8.19 —7.48
in (2.2) (3.5) (3.8) (4.2)
current price ratio .55 .68 .67 .47
less lagged two years (2.2) (3.3) (3.0) (2.6)
current price ratio .79 .02 —.56 —.40
less lagged four years (2.2) (0.0) (1.3) (1.1)
price ratio .69 1.14 1.42 1.07
times income: (2.2) (3.0) (3.3) (3.0)
in(p'/p)in y
price ratio —2.01 —2.96 —3.78 —2.25
times price index (1.5) (2.2) (2.5) (1.9)
lfl(p/p)lfl
difference in squared .66 .91 1.18 .59
price atios. 2 (1.2) (1.8) (2.1) (1.4)
(lnp) —(lnp)
income: y .31 .46 .59 .70
(4.5) (7.4) (8.4) 12.4)
constant —1.16 -.89 —.46 —.31
(7.0) (8.2) (3.5) (3.3)
.946 .886 .961 .984—24—
Table 4: Pooled Ownership Estimates
(t—statistics in parentheses)
Equation (1): Constant Equation (2): Constant
Varies by Age Class and Income Coefficient
Varying by Age Class
price ratio —6.15 —6.90
(6.3) (7.4)
current price ratio .56 .52
less lagged 2 years (5.3) (5.4)
price ratio .90 .95
times income (5.0) (6.2)
price ratio —2.15 —2.06
times price index (3.5) (3.9)
difference in .62 .62





Age Class Age Class
25 25—29 30—34 35—44 25 25—29 30—34 35—44
constant* —1.63 —1.05 —.41 —.03—1.34 —.94 —.47 —.19
(32.1) (30.1) (10.3) (0.6) (9.9) (8.0) (2.9) (2.8)
income* .40 .50 .57 .61
(4.1) (3.2) (1.1) (20.5)
income .769 .555 .364 .257 .448 .503 .373 .274
elasticity**
price —.180 —.124 —.049 —.039—.348—.227 —.106 —.075
elasticity**
*The t-statistics for married couples under 35 refer to the significance of the
coefficients from that for the 35-44 age class, not from zero.
**Computed for medium income owners in 1973.—25—
Table 5: Income and Price Elasticities and Ownership Rates, 1973
Income
125 OÔ 1973 Income 4000 6000 8500
20000
Median After—tax





























































Table 6: Ownership Rates and Median After-Tax
Real Incomes (1985$) by Age Class
Under 25 25—29 30-34 35—44
Average Ownership
Rate
1973 .326 .541 .708 .794
1979 .374 .589 .751 .832
1983 .310 .530 .702 .812
Median After—Tax
Real Income
1973 19908 24876 28000 29416
1979 20495 25597 28131 30150
1983 19610 25674 28571 31359—27—
Table 7: Changes in Observed Average Ownership Rates
and in Simulated Ownership Rates for Median Income Married Couples
Age Class
Under 25 25—29 30—34 35—44
1973 to 1979:
Observed Change .049 .048 .043 .038
Simulated Change .009 .034 .026 .024
Due to Price Variation .003 .027 .025 .020
1979 to 1983:
Observed Change —.064 —.059 —.049 —.020
Simulated Change —.038 —.039 —.022 -.008
DuetoPrice Variation —.027 —.046 —.029 —.022
1973 to 1983:
Observed Change —.015 -.011 —.006 .018
Simulated Change —.029 -.005 .004 .017
Due to Price Variation -.024 —.019 —.004 —.002—28—
Table 8: Long Run Impact of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 on Ownership Rates
Age Class
Before—Tax Income Under 25 25—29 30-34 35—44
as Renters, 1988$
15,000 .025 .034 .037 .036
25,000 .011 .012 .013 .011
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DATA APPENDIX
The calculations of the annual cost of owner—occupied housing generally
follow Hendershott and Shilling (l982a, p. 107). variables assumed to be
constant over time are economic depreciation (0.012)
,sellingcosts (0.06)
loan origination fee as a percent of loan (0.015), and loan— and structure-to-
value ratios (0.80 and 0.83, respectively). We also assume annual maintenance
expenditures equal to 2 percent of property value.
The variables that change over time are listed in Table A. Columns 1,2
and 3 contain the annual property tax rates (from Hendershott and Shilling),
the contract mortgage interest rate for owner—occupied housing (the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board effective interest rate, minus the estimated effect of
discount points), up—front financing costs (appraisal fees, title andrecording
fees, for example) assumed not to vary with loan size. Estimated to be $800 in
1984, prior years are obtained by deflating by the CPI-U Xl index.
Columns 4,5, and 6 are commodity-specific expected inflation rates for
the general, house price, and rent indicies, respectively. Theseadaptive
expectations are constructed as 16—quarter distributed lags on the current and
past rates of inflation of the relevent indicies (see Hendershott and
Shilling). Expected general inflation for each quarter is constructed using
the quarterly CPI—UX1 series; quarterly estimates are thenaveraged to produce
the annual figures in column 4. A pure expected house price inflation series
is calculated in similar fashion; the quarterly constant quality houseprice
index and the lagged weights are first used to estimate anunderlying expected
quarterly house price appreciation index and then an annual average is
computed. Column S is an average of this pure house price appreciation series
and the expected rate of general inflation (column 4). The expected rate of
growth in the implicit rental income that homeowners receive, column 6, is also
a simple average, but in this case of expected general inflation and an—32—
underlying expected rental rate inflation series constructed based up on the
Lowry (1981) rental housing index, again using the 16—quarter lagged weights.
Column 7 contains the house price ratio used to convert nominal annual
costs of owner—occupied housing into real terms. The ratio equals the constant
quality house price index divided by the general (CPI-U Xl) price index, with
both series equal to 100 in 1972.
The price of owner—occupied housing services relevant to the tenure
decision is the annual after—tax cost of obtaining the average (not the
marginal) dollar's worth of owner—occupied housing services. The tax rate for
this calculation is defined as the average tax rate at which housing related
expenditures, including forgone interest on invested equity, are deducted.
Because tenure choice tax rates vary widely across households, these tax rates,
and thus annual owner costs, are estimated for married couples using the median
income of each AIRS income class considered in the years 1973—1983 (excluding
1982). Separate tax rate tables are inputed for each year (married couples
under 30 are presumed to have one dependent; those over 30, two dependents).
Property tax rates and mortgage rates for these calculations are taken from
columns 1 and 2. The equity rate is presumed to be the maximum of 0.7 times
the contract mortgage rate ("the tax-exempt rate") or the after—tax contract
rate plus a 0.03 risk premium. Nonhousing related itemized deductions for each
year, including both average and marginal state and local income tax rates, are
based on the average deductions of itemizing owners in each income class
considered. These averages are taken from each year's Statistics of Income
data (IRS Publications 1304). Other assumptions follow }lendershott and Ling
(1986). To calculate the two and four year lagged owner prices for each
income class, the median income in the current year is deflated back to thelag
year using the CPI-U Xl index.—33—
The income variable used in the regression equations is the estimated
after—tax income of the household, assuming it rented (and itemized if optimal
do to so).
For the annual cost of rental housing, we compute the equilibrium cost
for a year in which equilibrium seems to have existed and then extrapolate that
cost backward and forward using a real rent series. This series, listed in
column 8 of Table A, is the Lowrey index divided by the general price index
(CPI—U Xl), with both indicies convertedto 100 in 1977. This series implies
an 8 percent decline in real rents between 1972 and 1975, roughly constant real
rents through 1981, and then a 7 percent rise by 1984. Given the constancy of
real rents in the late 1970s, we assume equilibrium existed in 1977.
The calculation of 1977 rents employs the following equation:
P =-(l-t)CPIT÷ (l—t)RP
(l+P_d)n- +tjDnn
n=2 (l+k) n=2 (l+k) n=2(l+k)
÷P(l—B) (1+q_yd)N—g[P(l+q_yd)N_(P_SL))-t(TD—SL)
(l+k)1 (l+k)N (l+k)N
where CPIT =interestand property taxes incurred during the one year
construction period,
t =marginaltax rate of the marginal investor in rental property,
R =rentduring first year of operation,
p =expectedinflation rate in rents,
q =expectedinflation rate in asset value,
d =rateof economic depreciation,
k =weightedaverage cost of capital,
Pt =annualproperty tax rate,
oe =annualoperating expense rate,
y =initialstructure to value ratio,
DEP =taxdepreciation in year n,
B=percentageselling cost,
N =optimalexpected holding period,
g =capitalgains tax rate,
SL =depreciationaccumulated under straight-line method, and
TD =accumulatedtax depreciation.-34-
The cost of capital (or capital budgeting) approach is employed. Rather than
including debt payments in the cash flows, all nondebt payments are discounted
by the weighted average Cost of capital (average of debt and equity rates),
equal to 6.4% in 1977 (Hendershott, Follain and Ling, 1987). Economic
depreciation rates of 0.014 for rents and 0.018 for prices are assumed, and the
expected rate of inflation in both rents and value is taken to be the general
expected inflation rate. Other assumptions include: t=0.5, g=0.25, pt=0.0l4,
oe=0.02, B=0.03, y=O.88 and DEP is based on 200% declining balance over 30
years. The holding period, N, is determined endogenously as that which
minimizes the rental price. Solving the above equation for R and dividing
through by P produces estimates of the 1977 rental price per dollar of purchase
price. These results are multiplied by 1.1358, the change in real house prices
between 1973 and 1977 (column 7),toobtain the column 9 real rental price
estimates of 0.0737 for 1977. This value is extrapolated forward and backward
using column 8.
Table A: Data Series
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Expected Real
Property Contract Other CPI—U XlHouse ExpectedHouseRentRental
Tax Mtg. Up-Front ExpectedPrice Rent PricePrice Index
Year Rate Rate Costs Gen. Inf. Inflation Inflation Ratio Ratio
69 0.0193 0.0765 312 0.0403 0.0504 0.0359 0.9767 1.0397 0.0766
70 0.0205 0.0829 326 0.0438 0.0443 0.0414 0.9572 1.0386 0.0766
71 0.0206 0.0758 337 0.0435 0.0466 0.0464 0.9678 1.0548 0.0778
72 0.0195 0.0743 349 0.0370 0.0465 0.0420 1.0000 1.0671 0.0787
73 0.0179 0.0797 378 0.0506 0.0619 0.0491 1.0226 1.0500 0.0774
74 0.0167 0.0908 420 0.0766 0.0814 0.0639 1.0178 1.0050 0.0741
75 0.0166 0.0900 448 0.0787 0.0856 0.0665 1.0389 0.9867 0.0727
76 0.0161 0.0883 470 0.0682 0.0795 0.0632 1.0710 0.9920 0.0731
77 0.0151 0.0880 500 0.0636 0.0852 0.0641 1.1358 1.0000 0.0737
78 0.0126 0.0956 539 0.0649 0.0936 0.0661 1.2112 0.9998 0.0737
79 0.0113 0.1110 598 0.0805 0.1068 0.0765 1.2659 0.9824 0.0724
80 0.0108 0.1360 662 0.0956 0.1059 0.0892 1.2529 0.9676 0.0713
81 0.0110 0.1634 718 0.0945 0.0964 0.0915 1.2469 0.9698 0.0715
82 0.0110 0.1608 754 0.0758 0.0671 0.0806 1.2104 0.9921 0.0731
83 0.0110 0.1282 783 0.0548 0.0454 0.0646 1.1890 1.0173 0.0750
84 0.0110 0.1374 800 0.0407 0.0390 0.0510 1.2021 1.0360 0.0764</ref_section>